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Abstract
We investigate the farsighted stable set in a class of strategic games with domi-
nant punishment strategies. In this class of games, each player has a strategy that
uniformly minimizes the other players' payos for any given strategies of other
players. We particularly investigate a special class of the farsighted stable sets
each of which consists of strategy proles yielding a single payo vector. We call
such farsighted stable sets as the single-payo farsighted stable sets. We propose
a concept called the inclusive set that completely characterizes the single-payo
farsighted stable sets in the strategic games with dominant punishment strategies.
We also show that the set of payo vectors yielded by the single-payo farsighted
stable sets is closely related to the strict -core in strategic games. Further, we
apply the results to the strategic games where each player has two strategies and
strategic games associated with some market models.
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1 Introduction
The rst solution concept in games with coalitional behavior is the stable set (von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern, 1944), the denition of which is based on the dominance relation
among the outcomes. Harsanyi (1974) argued the importance of taking the farsighted-
ness of players into account in view of the underlying bargaining process for the stable
set. He proposed the indirect dominance relation that incorporates the farsightedness
of the players. Later, Chwe (1994) formulated the indirect dominance relation and the
farsighted stable set in abstract games. His farsighted stable set can be applied to
strategic games by employing the coalitional or individual contingent threats situation
by Greenberg (1990).
Thereafter, the farsighted stable set has been investigated in various strategic games
associated with economic situations. For example, Masuda (2002) for the average return
game of a production economy; Suzuki and Muto (2005) and Nakanishi (2009) for the
prisoners' dilemma game with and without coalitional deviation, respectively; Kawasaki
and Muto (2009) for the indivisible public good provision game, Kamijo and Muto
(2010) for cartel formation game; Shino and Kawasaki (2012) for the Hotelling's location
game; Kawasaki, et al. (2015) for the tari game, among others.1 In the most of these
literature, the farsighted stable sets each of which yields a single payo vector were
well-investigated and shown to have nice properties. We will refer such a farsighted
stable set as the single-payo farsighted stable set. The single-payo farsighted stable
set also has a nice property from the theoretical aspect. Dutta and Vohra (2016) dened
the farsighted stable set with rational expectations and showed the equivalence to the
farsighted stable set if both are single-payo sets2.
This paper characterizes the single-payo farsighted stable set in a general class of
strategic games, called the class of strategic games with dominant punishment strategies.
1The farsighted stable set is also applied to the problems in other forms. For example, Diamantoudi
and Xue (2003) for the hedonic coalition formation problem; Diamantoudi (2005) for the cartel for-
mation problem; Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2015) and Benchekroun and Chaudhuri (2015) for the
international environmental agreement formation problems; Page and Wooders (2009) for the network
formation problem; Kawasaki (2010) and Klaus, et al. (2010) for the exchange economy with indivisible
goods under the weak and strong dominance relations, respectively; Klaus, et al. (2011) for the room-
mate problem; Mouleon, et al. (2011) for the two-sided matching markets, and it is extended to a more
general setting by Roketskiy (2012), among others.
2Dutta and Vohra (2016) dened the farsighted stable set with rational expectations for more abstract
games that includes not only the strategic games but also coalitional games and other forms. We can
apply their result to the strategic games and the farsighted stable set due to Chwe (1994).
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The dominant punishment strategy was formulated by Nakayama (1998). In words, a
strategy of a player is called the dominant punishment strategy of that player (against
the other players) if it uniformly minimizes the other players' payos with irrespective
to the strategy choices of other players. The class of strategic games with dominant
punishment strategies includes various games. Indeed, some of the strategic games and
those appropriately associated with the problems in the previously introduced literature
are included. The strategic games with monotone externalities3 and the strategic games
with punishment dominance relation (Masuzawa, 2003) are also the strategic games with
dominant punishment strategies if the strategy sets are compact. See Nakayama (1998)
for more examples.
The main result of this paper is summarized as follows. In a strategic game with
dominant punishment strategies, the set of strategy proles yielding a single payo
vector is a single-payo farsighted stable set if and only if the set satises a condition
that will be called the inclusiveness. The dominant punishment strategies are exploited
to obtain the suciency of this equivalence, while the necessity can be shown without
the dominant punishment strategies. Also, we will show that the set of the yielded payo
vectors by the inclusive sets is closely related to the strict -core. Further, we will apply
these results for the strategic games where each player has two strategies and strategic
games associated with a pure exchange economy and a many-to-many matching problem
with substitutable preferences, respectively.
The single-payo farsighted stable set is also investigated in coalitional games. Beal,
et al. (2008) showed the following interesting, but problematic result under a very mild
condition4. In the TU coalitional games, any singleton consisting of an imputation not
in the interior of the core is a farsighted stable set. Ray and Vohra (2015a) pointed out
that this result is due to the unreasonable coalitional sovereignty in the denition of the
indirect dominance relation. To resolve this problem, Ray and Vohra (2015a) introduced
the eectivity of the coalitions to describe explicitly what outcomes a coalition can
induce from a given outcome in coalitional games, which is a missed argument from
Harsanyi's (1974) indirect dominance relation. Recently, Chander (2015) introduced a
similar indirect dominance relation to the partition function games.
3For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1990, 1996) considered the subclass of the games with strategic
complementarities that also has this property.
4For the NTU coalitional game, Bhattacharya and Brosi (2011) showed the existence of the farsighted
stable set but did not argue its characteristics explicitly.
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Under the new indirect dominance relation, Ray and Vohra (2015a) showed that the
single-payo farsighted stable set is equivalent to the separable payo vector, which is
closely related to the coalition structure core of the coalitional game. Also, Chander
(2015) showed that the union of the single-payo farsighted stable sets is equivalent to
the strong-core. Further, he showed that they lie between the -core and the -core
in the partition function game with positive or negative externalities. The main result
of this paper is a counterpart of these results in the strategic game. In particular, our
result is closely related to that of Ray and Vohra (2015a) as the inclusive set is a close,
but slightly dierent concept from the separable payo, which will be discussed in the
later section.
Another related result is Corollary 1 by Kawasaki (2015). He showed a similar
characterization of the single-payo farsighted stable set in two-player strategic games
where the minimax payo coincides with the maxmin payo for both players. He also
showed that this condition is not sucient when there are three players. In the strategic
game with dominant punishment strategies, the coincidence of the minimax payo and
the maximin payo of each player is guaranteed since the - and -coalitional games
coincide with each other. (Nakayama, 1998.) Our result requires a stronger condition
than that of Kawasaki (2015) but applies to n-player games.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce
some basic denitions. In section 3, we dene two important concepts, the single-payo
farsighted stable set and the inclusive set. The main results are stated and proved in
section 4. We apply our main results for the strategic game where each player has two
strategies and strategic games associated with certain market models in section 5 and
6, respectively. In the nal section, we conclude with a remark.
2 Preliminaries
The following notations are used throughout this paper. For any pair of real vectors
x; y 2 R`, we denote x = y i xi = yi for all i = 1; :::; `; x  y i xi  yi for all
i = 1; :::; `; and x > y i xi > yi for all i = 1; :::; `, respectively. For each nite set A, let
jAj denote the cardinality of A and 2A denote the power set of A, respectively.
A strategic game is dened by a tuple G = (N; (Xi)i2N ; (vi)i2N), where N = f1; :::; ng
is the set of players, Xi is the set of strategies for each i 2 N , and vi :
Q
i2N Xi ! R is
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the payo function of each i 2 N . A nonempty subset of N is called a coalition. Let
N = 2N n f;g denote the set of coalitions. For each S 2 N , we denote XS =
Q
i2S Xi.
For the simplicity, we denote X = XN and X i = XNnfig for each i 2 N . Similarly,
for each S 2 N , i 2 N , and x 2 X, we denote vS(x) = (vi(x))i2S, v(x) = vN(x), and
v i(x) = vNnfig(x). Further, for each S 2 N n fNg, i 2 N , and x 2 X, we denote
xS = (xi)i2S and x i = xNnfig.
In a strategic game G, x 2 X is said to be (Pareto) ecient i there exists no y 2 X
such that v(y)  v(x) and v(y) 6= v(x); x 2 X is said to be weakly (Pareto) ecient i
there exists no y 2 X such that v(y) > v(x).
The following concept formulated by Nakayama (1998) and its strict modication
will play important roles in this paper.
Denition 1 Let G be a strategic game and i 2 N .
 A strategy di 2 Xi is said to be a dominant punishment strategy of i (against
N n fig) i for any xi 2 Xi and any x i 2 X i, v i(x)  v i(di; x i).
 We say the dominant punishment strategy di of i is strict if for any xi 2 Xi n fdig
and any x i 2 X i, v i(x) > v i(di; x i).
We say a strategic game G is a strategic game with dominant punishment strategies
i there exists the dominant punishment strategy of each i 2 N . Similarly, G is a
strategic game with strictly dominant punishment strategies i there exists the strictly
dominant punishment strategy of each i 2 N .
Following Aumann and Peleg (1960), we dene the -coalitional game associated
with a strategic game. In what follows, we denote uS = (ui)i2S for each S 2 N and
u 2 Rn. Given a strategic game G = (N; (Xi)i2N ; (vi)i2N), the -coalitional game
associated with G is dened by   =
 
N; V G

, where V G : N  Rn is a characteristic
correspondence such that for each S 2 N ,
V G (S) =
(S
xS2XS
T
zNnS2XNnS

u 2 RnjuS  vS
 
xS; zNnS
	
if S 6= N ;S
x2X fu 2 Rnju  v(x)g if S = N:
Let G be a strategic game,   be the -coalitional game associated with G, and u 2 Rn
be a payo vector. In  , u is said to be (Pareto) ecient i u 2 V G (N) and there exists
no u0 2 V G (N) such that u0  u and u 6= u0; u is said to be weakly (Pareto) ecient i
5
u 2 V G (N) and there exists no u0 2 V G (N) such that u0 > u. Further, u is said to be
in the strict -core of G i u 2 V G (N) and there exists no S 2 N and u0 2 V G (S) such
that u0S  uS and u0S 6= uS; u is said to be in the relative interior of the strict -core of
G i u is in the strict -core and u =2 V G (S) for all S 2 N n fNg. Note that any payo
vector in the strict -core is ecient by denition.
Remark 1 We summarize the following well-known properties of the -coalitional game
  associated with a strategic game G.
(a)   satises the superadditivity, that is, V G (S) \ V G (T )  V G (S [ T ) for any
S; T 2 N with S \ T = ;. To see this, let S; T 2 N with S \ T = ; and u 2
V G (S) \ V G (T ). Then, there exist xS 2 XS and xT 2 XT such that uS  vS(xS; zNnS)
for any zNnS 2 XNnS and uT  vT (xT ; zNnT ) for any zNnT 2 XNnT . By S \ T = ;,
uS  vS(xS[T ; zNn(S[T )) and uT  vT (xS[T ; zNn(S[T )) for any zNn(S[T ) 2 XNn(S[T ).
Hence, u 2 V G (S [ T ). In particular,
T
S2P V
G
 (S)  V G (N) for all partition P of N .
(b) If u 2 Rn is ecient in  , then there exists some x 2 X such that u = v(x).
To see this, let u 2 Rn be an ecient payo vector in  . By u 2 V G (N), there exists
some x^ 2 X such that u  v(x^). The equality must hold by the eciency of u and
v(x^) 2 V G (N). On the other hand, this statement may fail for the weakly ecient
payo vector.
3 The farsighted stable set and the inclusive set
We introduce the concept of (coalitionally) farsighted stable set in strategic games due
to Chwe (1994). We begin with dening the inducibility and the indirect dominance
relation between two strategy proles. Let x; y 2 X and S 2 N . We say y is inducible
from x via S, denoted by x !S y, i xNnS = yNnS. We say y indirectly dominates x,
denoted by y  x, i there exist a sequence of strategy proles z0; :::; zm with z0 = x and
zm = y, and a sequence of coalitions S1; :::; Sm such that for all h = 1; :::;m, zh 1 !Sh zh
and vSh(y) > vSh(z
h 1).
In this paper, we will concentrate on a special class of the farsighted stable set, called
the single-payo farsighted stable set. Dene [x] = fy 2 Xjv(y) = v(x)g for any x 2 X
that will be sometimes called single-payo strategy set.
Denition 2 Let G be a strategic game.
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 We say K  X is a farsighted stable set (FSS) in G i K satises the following
two stabilities:
Internal stability: for any x; y 2 K, x  y does not hold;
External stability: for any x 2 X nK, there exists some y 2 K such that y  x.
 We say K is a single-payo farsighted stable set (SP-FSS) in G i K is a FSS
and K = [x] for some x 2 X.
In coalitional games, Ray and Vohra (2015a) showed that the set of outcomes yielding
a single payo vector is a SP-FSS dened by their indirect dominance relation if and
only if the payo vector is separable. Here, we give the denition of the separable payo
vector in terms of the -coalitional game. Let   = (N; V G ) be an -coalitional game
associated with a strategic game G. A payo vector u 2 Rn is said to be separable in
  i (i) u is ecient in  ;5 (ii) for any T 2 N n fNg and any partition P(T ) of T ,
if u 2 V G (T 0) for all T 0 2 P(T ), there exists some nonempty S  N n T such that
u 2 V G (S). We introduce a corresponding concept for the single-payo strategy set,
called the inclusive set.
Denition 3 Let G be a strategic game and x 2 X. We say [x] is an inclusive set in G
i for any S 2 N and any yS 2 XS, vS(yS; zNnS)  vS(x) for any zNnS 2 XNnS implies
yS = x
0
S for some x
0 2 [x].
Given x 2 X, a single-payo strategy set [x] is called an inclusive set if it includes
any strategy prole such that a coalition can guarantee for themselves the payos at
x by taking the part of the strategy prole. The denition of the inclusive set can be
restated as follows in a strategic game with dominant punishment strategies.
Remark 2 Let G be a strategic game with dominant punishment strategies and x 2 X.
For each i 2 N , let di denote the dominant punishment strategy of i. We say [x] is an
inclusive set in G i for any S 2 N and any yS 2 XS, vS
 
yS; dNnS
  vS(x) implies
yS = x
0
S for some x
0 2 [x].
5In Ray and Vohra (2015a), the denition of the eciency of a payo vector in a (possibly not
superadditive) coalitional game (N;V ) is slightly dierent from ours as follows: u is ecient i u 2T
S2P V (S) for some partition P of N and there exists no partition P 0 of N and u0 2
T
S2P0 V (S) such
that u0  u and u0 6= u. This denition is equivalent to that in the present paper for the -coalitional
games by its generic superadditivity as mentioned in Remark 1(a).
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Ray and Vohra (2015a) argued the close relationship between the separable payo
vectors and the coalition structure core in coalitional games. We show that the inclusive
set also has a close relationship with the strict -core in strategic games.
Proposition 1 Let G be a strategic game and x 2 X.
(a) If v(x) is in the relative interior of the strict -core of G, then [x] is an inclusive
set in G.
(b) If [x] is an inclusive set in G, then v(x) is in the strict -core of G.
Proof. Let   =
 
N; V G

be the -coalitional game associated with a strategic game G
and x 2 X.
(a) Assume that v(x) is in the relative interior of the strict -core of G. By the
eciency of v(x), v(y)  v(x) implies v(y) = v(x) and y 2 [x] for any y 2 X. By
v(x) =2 V G (S) for any S 2 N n fNg, there exists no T 2 N n fNg and yT 2 XT such
that vT (yT ; zNnT )  vT (x) for any zNnT 2 XNnT at all. Thus, [x] is an inclusive set in G.
(b) Assume that [x] is an inclusive set in G. Suppose that v(x) is not in the strict
-core of G. Then, there exist some S 2 N and u0 2 V G (S) such that u0S  vS(x)
and u0S 6= vS(x). Let j 2 S such that u0j > vj(x). By u0 2 V G (S), there exists some
yS 2 XS such that vS
 
yS; zNnS
  u0S for any zNnS 2 XNnS. Thus, for any zNnS 2 XNnS,
vj
 
yS; zNnS
  u0j > vj(x). Hence,  yS; zNnS =2 [x] for any zNnS 2 XNnS, contradicting
that [x] is an inclusive set. 
Therefore, the union of the payo vectors yielded by the inclusive sets is very close to
the strict -core. We also point out that the inclusive sets in a strategic game is related
to the separable payo vectors by Ray and Vohra (2015a) in the associated -coalitional
game.
Proposition 2 Let G be a strategic game,   be the -coalitional game associated with
G, and x 2 X. If u = v(x) is separable in  , then [x] is an inclusive set in G.
Proof. Let G be a strategic game,   be the -coalitional game associated with G, and
x 2 X. Assume that u = v(x) is separable in  .
Fix arbitrary S1 2 N and xS1 2 XS1 such that vS1(xS1 ; zNnS1)  uS1 for any zNnS1 2
XNnS1 . Then, u 2 V G (S1). If S1 = N , then v(x) = u follows from the eciency of u,
and thus x 2 [x]. Therefore, assume that S1 6= N .
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Since u is separable in  , there exist some S2 2 N such that S2  N n S1 and
u 2 V G (S2), and some S3 2 N such that S3  N n (S1 [ S2) and u 2 V G (S3), and
so on. Eventually, there exists a partition fS1; :::; Skg of N such that u 2 V G (Sh) for
all h = 1; :::; k. Then, for each h = 2; :::; k, there exists some xSh 2 XSh such that
vSh(x

Sh
; zNnSh)  uSh for any zNnSh 2 XNnSh . Therefore, v(x)  u. By the eciency of
u, v(x) = u. Thus, x 2 [x], and [x] is an inclusive set in G. 
Note that neither Proposition 1 nor 2 requires the dominant punishment strategies.
On the other hand, the converse of Proposition 2 does not hold even in a strategic game
with dominant punishment strategies. We show this fact by employing the lumpy public
good game due to Taylor (1987), the FSS of which was investigated by Kawasaki and
Muto (2009).
The lumpy public good game is a strategic game, where Xi = fC;Dg for all i 2 N
and the payo functions are dened as follows. Let g : fC;Dg  f0; :::; n  1g ! R be
a function such that
g(C; h) =
(
B  K if h  r   1;
 K if h < r   1;
g(D; h) =
(
B if h  r;
0 if h < r,
where 0 < K < B and r = 1; :::; n  1 is a constant. Then,
vi(x) =
(
g(C; jC(x)j   1) if xi = C;
g(D; jC(x)j) if xi = D;
where C(x) = fi 2 N jxi = Cg. Note that D is the dominant punishment strategy of
each player.
Dene x 2 X be a strategy prole such that xi = C for all i = 1; :::; r and xi = D
for all i = r + 1; :::; n. It can be easily conrmed that [x] = fxg is an inclusive set.
Note that vi(x
) = B K for all i = 1; :::; r and vi(x) = B for all i = r+1; :::; n. Let
R = f1; :::; rg. Then, v(x) 2 V G (R), but v(x) =2 V G (S) for all nonempty S  N nR
since either the payos of at least r members in S are at most B  K (when jSj  r)
or any member in S obtains at most the payo 0 (when jSj < r), while vi(x) = B for
all i 2 N nR. Hence, v(x) is not separable.
In some strategic games, on the other hand, any inclusive set turns out to be a
separable payo vectors in the associated -coalitional games. We will discuss this
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point later in Section 6.
4 Main results
In this section, we state and prove the main results.
Theorem 1 Let G be a strategic game with dominant punishment strategies and x 2 X.
In G, if [x] is an inclusive set, then [x] is a SP-FSS.
Proof. Let G be a strategic game with dominant punishment strategies and di denote
the dominant punishment strategy of each i 2 N . Fix an arbitrary x 2 X. Assume that
[x] is an inclusive set. Note that x is ecient in G by Proposition 1(b).
Claim 1 [x] satises the internal stability.
Proof of Claim 1. Fix arbitrary y; y0 2 [x]. Suppose that y  y0. Then, there exist
sequences of strategy proles z0(= y0); :::; zm(= y) and coalitions S1; :::; Sm such that
for each h = 1; :::;m, zh 1 !Sh zh and vSh
 
zh 1

< vSh(y). However, constructing such
sequences is impossible by v(y0) = v(z0) = v(y). Hence, y  y0 is impossible. 
We turn to the proof of the external stability of [x]. For any x0 2 X, dene
L(x0; x) = fi 2 N jvi(x0) < vi(x)g :
Claim 2 For any x0 2 X, L(x0; x) = ; if and only if x0 2 [x].
Proof of Claim 2. Fix an arbitrary x0 2 X. First, assume that L(x0; x) = ;. Then,
v(x0)  v(x). By the eciency of x, v(x0) = v(x). Thus, x0 2 [x].
Next, assume that L(x0; x) 6= ;. Then, there exists some j 2 N such that vj(x0) <
vj(x). Thus, x
0 =2 [x]. 
Fix an arbitrary y 2 X n [x]. We construct a sequence of strategy proles and
a sequence of coalitions that consist an indirect dominance relation x0  y for some
x0 2 [x]. Dene z0 = y and
Sh =

i 2 L(zh 1; x)jzh 1i 6= di
	
;
zh =

dSh ; z
h 1
NnSh

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for each h = 1; :::m iteratively as long as Sh 6= ;. Thus, m is the maximum natural
number such that Sm 6= ;. Note that if S1 = ;, then m = 0.
We conrm that such a nite m exists. Suppose that Sh 6= ; for any natural number
h. For any h, if i 2 Sh, then zh0 1i = di and i =2 Sh0 for all h0 > h. Thus, Sh \ Sh0 = ;
for any dierent h and h0. This means that the number of players taking the dominant
punishment strategies at zh monotonically increases as h increases. This contradicts the
niteness of N . Thus, there exists the maximum m such that Sm 6= ;.
Claim 3 (i) If zm 2 [x], then zm  y.
(ii) If zm =2 [x] and there exist some S^ 2 N and z^ 2 [x] such that zm !S^ z^ and
vS^(z
m) < vS^(z^), then z^  y.
Proof of Claim 3. For each h = 1; :::;m, zh 1 !Sh zh since zhi 6= zh 1i implies i 2 Sh
for each i 2 N . For each h = 1; :::;m, we have vSh(x) > vSh(zh 1) by Sh  L(zh 1; x).
By these observations, (i) if zm 2 [x], then the sequences z0(= y); :::; zm(2 [x]) and
S1; :::; Sm consist an indirect dominance relation zm  y; (ii) if zm =2 [x] and there exist
some S^ 2 N and z^ 2 [x] such that zm !S^ z^ and vS^(zm) < vS^(z^), then the sequences
z0(= y); :::; zm; z^(2 [x]) and S1; :::; Sm; S^ consist an indirect dominance relation z^  y.

Assume that L(zm; x) = ;. Then zm 2 [x] by Claim 2. Thus, zm  y by Claim 3(i).
Assume that L(zm; x) 6= ;. Then, zm =2 [x] by Claim 2. By the construction of
m, we have zmL(zm;x) = dL(zm;x). First, consider the case where L(z
m; x) = N . In this
case, zm !N x and v(zm) < v(x). Thus, x  y by Claim 3(ii). Next, consider the
case where L(zm; x) 6= N . In this case, vNnL(zm;x)(zmNnL(zm;x); dL(zm;x))  vNnL(zm;x)(x) by
zmL(zm;x) = dL(zm;x). Since [x] is an inclusive set, there exists some x
 2 [x] such that
xNnL(zm;x) = z
m
NnL(zm;x). Then, z
m !L(zm;x) x and vL(zm;x)(x) > vL(zm;x)(zm). Thus,
x  y by Claim 3(ii), where x 2 [x]. Hence, [x] is a SP-FSS. 
Theorem 2 Let G be a strategic game and x 2 X. In G, if [x] is a SP-FSS, then [x] is
an inclusive set.
Proof. Let G be a strategic game and x 2 X. We show the contraposition. Assume
that [x] is not an inclusive set in G. Then, there exist some S 2 N and some yS 2 XS
11
such that vS(yS; zNnS)  vS(x) for any zNnS 2 XNnS and yS 6= x0S for all x0 2 [x]. Fix an
arbitrary yNnS 2 XNnS. Note that vS(y)  vS(x) and y =2 [x] by the choice of yS.
Suppose that there exists some x0 2 [x] such that x0  y. Then, there exist a
sequence of strategy proles z0; :::; zm and a sequence of coalitions S1; :::; Sm such that
z0 = y, zm = x0, and for all h = 1; :::;m, zh 1 !Sh zh and vSh(x0) > vSh(zh 1). By
vS(y)  vS(x) = vS(x0), S \ S1 = ;.
Fix an arbitrary h = 2; :::;m. We claim that if S \ S` = ; for all ` = 1; :::; h   1,
then S \ Sh = ;. Since S \ S` = ; for all ` = 1; :::; h   1, zh 1S = yS. By the choice of
yS, vS(z
h 1) = vS(yS; zh 1NnS)  vS(x0). By vSh(x0) > vSh(zh 1), S \ Sh = ;.
By this mathematical induction, S\ Smh=1 Sh = ;. Thus, z0S = zmS . This contradicts
that yS 6= x0S. Hence, x^  y does not hold for all x^ 2 [x], and [x] does not satisfy the
external stability. 
From Theorem 1 and 2, we obtain the following corollary that completely character-
izes the SP-FSS in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies.
Corollary 1 Let G be a strategic game with dominant punishment strategies and x 2 X.
In G, [x] is a SP-FSS if and only if [x] is an inclusive set.
Corollary 1 is a counterpart of Theorem 2 by Ray and Vohra (2015a), where the SP-
FSS of the coalitional game dened by their indirect dominance relation is characterized
by the separable payo vectors. Since the inclusive set is closely related to the strict
-core, Corollary 1 is also related to the result by Chander (2015) who showed the
equivalence between the SP-FSS and the strong-core in the partition function game.
In the proof of Ray and Vohra (2015a), singleton coalitions play important roles to
construct the indirect dominance relation. Note that the construction of an indirect
dominance relation in the proof of Theorem 1 in the present paper is similar with that
in the proof of Theorem 2 in Ray and Vohra (2015a), though the inclusive set is dierent
from the separable payo vector. The dominant punishment strategies play the similar
role with the singleton coalitions in their proof. Further, a similar manner of constructing
the indirect dominance relation in a specic model is also found in the literature, for
example Suzuki and Muto (2005).
Note that the dominant punishment strategies are not required in Theorem 2. On
the other hand, the following example cited from Kawasaki (2015) demonstrates that
the dominant punishment strategies are essential to obtain Theorem 1.
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Example 1 (Kawasaki, 2015, Example 1) Let G be a strategic game where N =
f1; 2; 3g and Xi = fC;Dg for each i = 1; 2; 3. The payos are dened as follows, where
player 1 chooses rows, player 2 chooses columns, and player 3 chooses matrices.
C D
C 1,1,1 0,5,0 C
D 5,0,0 5,0,0
C D
C 0,0,5 0,5,0 D
D 0,0,5 5,0,0
Player 2 is the only player who does not have the dominant punishment strategy
since v1(D;C;D) = 0 < 5 = v1(D;D;D) and v3(D;C;D) = 5 > 0 = v3(D;D;D),
while D is the dominant punishment strategy of both player 1 and 3. It is easy to see
that (C;C;C) is ecient. It is also easy to see that v 2 V G (fig) implies vi  0 for all
i = 1; 2; 3 and v 2 V G (fi; jg) implies either vi  0 or vj  0 for all i; j = 1; 2; 3 with
i 6= j. Thus, [(C;C;C)] = f(C;C;C)g is an inclusive set by Proposition 1(a). However,
Kawasaki (2015) showed that (C;C;C)  (D;C;C) does not hold, and [(C;C;C)] is
not a FSS. Hence, Theorem 1 does not hold even if there is only one player without the
dominant punishment strategy.
The following corollary is obtained from Remark 1(b), Proposition 2, and Corollary
1.
Corollary 2 Let G be a strategic game with dominant punishment strategies and   be
the -coalitional game associated with G. If there exists a separable payo vector in  ,
then the SP-FSS exists in G.
In other words, a SP-FSS in the sense of Chwe (1994) exists in a strategic game with
dominant punishment strategies if a SP-FSS in the sense of Ray and Vohra (2015a) exists
in the -coalitional game associated with the strategic game. However, the SP-FSS may
fail to exist even if the strict -core is nonempty. To see this, the following result will
be helpful, which strengthens Proposition 1(b) with the strictly dominant punishment
strategies.
Proposition 3 Let G be a strategic game with strictly dominant punishment strategies
and x 2 X. For each i 2 N , let di denote the strictly dominant punishment strategy
of i. If [x] is a SP-FSS in G, then (i) v(x) is in the strict -core of G, and (ii) either
v(x) > v(dN) or v(x) = v(dN).
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Proof. Let G be a strategic game with strictly dominant punishment strategies and
x 2 X. Let di denote the strictly dominant punishment strategy of each i 2 N . Assume
that [x] is a SP-FSS in G. Then, [x] is an inclusive set in G by Theorem 2. Proposition
1(b) guarantees (i). For (ii), suppose that v(x) 6= v(dN) and there exists some i 2 N
such that vi(x)  vi(dN). Since [x] is an inclusive set, there exists some x0 2 [x] such that
x0i = di. By v(x
0) = v(x) 6= v(dN), x0j 6= dj for some j 6= i. Then, vi(x0) > vi(x0 j; dj) 
vi(dN)  vi(x) = vi(x0), a contradiction. Hence, x satises both (i) and (ii). 
Proposition 3 says that the inclusive set does not exist if neither v(x) > v(dN) nor
v(x) = v(dN) for any x 2 X such that v(x) is in the strict -core when each player has
the strictly dominant punishment strategy. We can easily construct such an example as
follows.
Example 2 Let G be a strategic game where N = f1; 2; 3g and Xi = fC;Dg for each
i = 1; 2; 3. The payos are dened as follows, where player 1 chooses rows, player 2
chooses columns, and player 3 chooses matrices.
C D
C 2,2,2 1,3,1 C
D 3,1,1 2,2,0
C D
C 1,1,5 0,2,4 D
D 2,0,4 1,1,3
Note that D is the strictly dominant punishment strategy of each player. It is easy
to see that (C;C;D) is the unique strategy prole that yields the payo vector in the
strict -core because v(C;C;D)  v(D;D;D) with v3(C;C;D) > v3(D;D;D), and for
any x 2 X n f(C;C;D); (D;D;D)g, vj(x) < vj(D;D;D) for at least one j 2 N . Thus,
for any strategy prole x 2 X n f(C;C;D)g, [x] is not an inclusive set by Proposition
1(b). However, (C;C;D) does not satisfy (ii) in Proposition 3 by vf1;2g(C;C;D) =
vf1;2g(D;D;D). Thus, [(C;C;D)] is not an inclusive set. Hence, the inclusive set does
not exist in this example.
The converse of Proposition 3 does not hold in general. We show it by another
example.
Example 3 Let G be a strategic game such that N = f1; 2g, Xi = [0; 1   "] for each
i = 1; 2, where " > 0 is a suciently small real number, and vi(x) = (1 xi)(x1+x2) for
each i = 1; 2. It is easy to see that di = 0 is the strictly dominant punishment strategy of
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each i = 1; 2. Note that this is the most simple case of the voluntary contribution game
of a public good with a slight modication to make 0 the strictly dominant punishment
strategy.
By a straightforward calculation, it is easy to see that payo vector (1=4; 3=4) >
(0; 0) = v(dN) is in the strict -core that is solely yielded by x
 = (3=4; 1=4). Thus, x
satises (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3 and [x] = fxg. However, player 1 can guarantee
the payo 1=4 for herself by taking strategy y1 = 1=2 even if player 2 takes 0. Thus, [x
]
is not an inclusive set in G. By Theorem 2, [x] is neither a SP-FSS in G.
On the other hand, we can obtain the converse of Proposition 3 in a special subclass
of the strategic games with strictly dominant punishment strategy. We show this fact
in the next section.
5 Binary games
We say a strategic game is binary when every player has two strategies. Such a game
often describes a situation where the players are facing to decide whether they participate
or not to an institution, an agreement, or a mechanism. A typical example is the cartel
formation problem due to d'Aspremont, et al. (1983)6. In this situation, the players
decide their strategies with foreseeing the outcome of the subsequent market stage that
varies according to the formed cartel in the current cartel formation stage, as pointed out
by Diamantoudi (2005). Therefore, the players are at least implicitly assumed farsighted,
and it seems consistent that the players also foresee the reaction by the other players
after changing their own decision in the cartel formation stage. In this sense, the binary
game is a nice application to consider the FSS.
Formally, a strategic game G = (N; (Xi)i2N ; (vi)i2N) is a binary game if Xi = fC;Dg
for all i 2 N . Without loss of generality, we may assume that D is the (strictly)
dominant punishment strategy of each i 2 N if a binary game G is a strategic game
with (strictly) dominant punishment strategies. Throughout this section, denote C(x) =
fi 2 N jxi = Cg for all x 2 X; for all S 2 N , denote CS = xS such that xi = C for all
i 2 S and DS = xS such that xi = D for all i 2 S. The following result strengthens
Proposition 3 for binary games.
6d'Aspremont, et al. (1983) formulated the problem in an abstract model. Later, Kamijo and Muto
(2010) reformulated it to the strategic game and investigated the FSS in the sense of Chwe (1994) in it.
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Proposition 4 Let G be a binary game with strictly dominant punishment strategies
and x 2 X. In G, [x] is a SP-FSS if and only if (i) x is ecient, and (ii) either
v(x) > v(DN) or v(x) = v(DN).
Proof. Let G be a binary game with strictly dominant punishment strategies and
x 2 X. The necessity follows from Proposition 3 and the eciency of the strict -core.
For the suciency, it suces to show that [x] is an inclusive set if x satises (i) and (ii)
by Theorem 1.
Assume that x satises (i) and (ii). Suppose that [x] is not an inclusive set. Then,
there exist some S 2 N and yS 2 XS such that vS
 
yS; DNnS
  vS(x) and yS 6= x0S for
all x0 2 [x]. By (i), S 6= N .
First, consider the case where v(x) = v(DN). Then, DN 2 [x]. By yS 6= DS,
vNnS
 
yS; DNnS

> vNnS(DN) = vNnS(x). This contradicts (i) by vS
 
yS; DNnS
  vS(x)
and S 6= N .
Next, consider the case where v(x) > v(DN). Note that C(x) 6= ; in this case. By
vS(yS; DNnS)  vS(x) > vS(DN), yi = C for some i 2 S. Denote T = C
 
yS; DNnS
 6= ;.
Note that T  S, and thus vT
 
yS; DNnS
  vT (x). If T = C(x), then yS = xS,
contradicting the choice of yS. Thus, T 6= C(x). If T  C(x), then vT
 
yS; DNnS

<
vT (x), contradicting vT (yS; DNnS)  vT (x). Therefore, assume that T nC(x) 6= ;. Then,
vC(x)
 
CT[C(x); DNn(T[C(x))

> vC(x)(x);
vNn(T[C(x))
 
CT[C(x); DNn(T[C(x))

> vNn(T[C(x))(x).
Further, by T n C(x)  T  T [ C(x) and vT
 
yS; DNnS
  vT (x),
vTnC(x)
 
CT[C(x); DNn(T[C(x))
  vTnC(x)  yS; DNnS  vTnC(x)(x):
These three inequalities contradict (i) by C(x) 6= ;. Hence, [x] is an inclusive set in G.

By the niteness of X, we immediately obtain the following corollary from Proposi-
tion 4.
Corollary 3 In a binary game with strictly dominant punishment strategies G, a SP-
FSS exists if and only if DN is ecient or not weakly ecient.
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Therefore, it suces to check the (weak) eciency of DN for the existence of SP-FSS in a
binary game with strictly dominant punishment strategies. Indeed, Example 2 appeared
in Section 4 is an example such that DN is weakly ecient, but not ecient. The
following two examples show that the strictness of the dominant punishment strategies
is essential for both the suciency and the necessity in Proposition 4.
Example 4 Let G be a strategic game where N = f1; 2; 3g and Xi = fC;Dg for each
i = 1; 2; 3. The payos are dened as follows, where player 1 chooses rows, player 2
chooses columns, and player 3 chooses matrices.
C D
C 3,3,0 3,3,0 C
D 3,3,0 1,1,0
C D
C 3,3,1 3,3,0 D
D 3,3,0 0,0,0
Note that D is the dominant punishment strategy of each player, but none of which
is strict. In this game, v(C;C;D) = (3; 3; 1) > (0; 0; 0) = v(D;D;D) and (C;C;D) is
ecient. Also, [(C;C;D)] = f(C;C;D)g. However [(C;C;D)] is not an inclusive set in
G because f1; 2g can guarantee payos (3; 3) for themselves by taking (C;D) and (D;C)
even if player 3 takes D. Hence, the suciency of Proposition 4 may not hold without
the strictly dominant punishment strategies.
Example 5 Let G be a strategic game where N = f1; 2; 3g and Xi = fC;Dg for each
i = 1; 2; 3. The payos are dened as follows, where player 1 chooses rows, player 2
chooses columns, and player 3 chooses matrices.
C D
C 3,3,1 0,4,1 C
D 4,0,1 1,1,0
C D
C 3,3,1 0,4,1 D
D 4,0,1 0,0,1
Note that D is the dominant punishment strategy of each player, but none of which
is strict. We show that [(C;C;C)] = f(C;C;C); (C;C;D)g is an inclusive set. For each
i = 1; 2 and xi 2 fC;Dg, vi(xi; D i) = 0. For player 3, both C and D take a part of some
strategy prole in [(C;C;C)]. For any xf1;2g 6= (C;C), vi(xf1;2g; D3) = 0 for at least either
one of i = 1; 2. For each i = 1; 2 and xfi;3g 2 Xfi;3g, vi(xfi;3g; Dj)  1, where j 6= i; 3.
Thus, [(C;C;C)] is an inclusive set in G. However, v3(C;C;C) = v3(D;D;D). Hence,
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the necessity of Proposition 4 may not hold without the strictly dominant punishment
strategies.
The n-player prisoners' dilemma (Okada, 1993) dened as follows is a strategic game
with strictly dominant punishment strategies, in which all the FSS were specied by
Suzuki and Muto (2005).
Let f : fC;Dg  f0; :::; n  1g ! R be a function such that (i) both f(C; k) and
f(D; k) are increasing in k; (ii) f(D; k) > f(C; k) for all k = 0; :::; k 1; (iii) f(C; n 1) >
f(D; 0). A binary game G is called the prisoners' dilemma i
vi(x) =
(
f(C; jC(x)j   1) if xi = C;
f(D; jC(x)j if xi = D:
Suzuki and Muto (2005) showed that for any x 2 X, [x] = fxg is a SP-FSS if and only
if x is ecient and v(x) > v(DN). Proposition 4 in the present paper extends this result
because DN is never ecient in the prisoners' dilemma.
In the prisoners' dilemma, Suzuki and Muto (2005) showed that there exists at most
one FSS with multiple payos, and it exists only for the degenerate case. On the other
hand, the lumpy public good game appeared in section 3 has a quite dierent type of
the FSS with multiple payos as shown by Kawasaki and Muto (2009). They showed
that there exist an inecient FSS except for the case where r = n   1: any x 2 X
with r  jC(x)j < n is contained in at least one FSS, while x is ecient if and only
if jC(x)j = r. This dierence shows that we need to exploit the structures of the
strategic games other than the dominant punishment strategies for characterizing the
multiple-payo FSS, even though the strategic game is binary.
Kamijo and Muto (2010) formulated the cartel formation problem by d'Aspremont,
et al. (1983) in a binary strategic game, where each rm chooses to participate or not
to participate to the cartel, and studied the FSS where coalitional behavior is allowed.
As pointed out by d'Aspremont, et al. (1983), each player may not have the dominant
punishment strategy in such a game. On the other hand, by Donsimoni, et al. (1986), we
can conrm that not to participate becomes the strictly dominant punishment strategy
of each rm in the strategic cartel formation game when the demand function and the
marginal cost function are linear. Similarly, we can derive the binary game with strictly
dominant punishment strategy of each player from the cartel formation problem with
heterogeneous rms by Donsimoni (1985) when the demand and marginal cost functions
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are linear. The heterogeneity of the players may make the problem more complex, but
Proposition 4 says that we only need to check the eciency and to compare the payos
with v(DN) for each strategy prole.
6 Market games
This section considers primitive strategic games naturally associated with some market
models. Some kinds of the stable sets with farsighted players have been well investigated
in market models such as Greenberg, et al. (2002), Kawasaki (2010), Klaus, et al. (2010),
and Mouleon, et al. (2011), among others. The FSS by Ray and Vohra (2015a) also
applies to the market economy models since they are frequently formulated in coalitional
games.
This section particularly considers two types of market models, the pure exchange
economy and the (many-to-many) matching problem. The strategic games associated
with these markets are shown to be those with dominant punishment strategies under
certain conditions, and the results in Section 4 apply. In each strategic game, the \status
quo" strategy becomes the dominant punishment strategies.
6.1 The exchange economy
This subsection considers the strategic game associated with the classical pure exchange
economy (Scarf, 1971). Consider an exchange economy with m commodities. Let N =
f1; :::; ng denote the set of agents (players). The preference relation of each i 2 N is
represented by a utility function ui : Rm+ ! R. Each i 2 N is endowed with !i 2 Rm+nf0g.
Let E = (N; (ui)i2N ; (!)i2N) denote an exchange economy.
Throughout this subsection, we assume that ui is continuous on Rm+ ; monotonically
increasing, i.e. for any x; x0 2 Rm+ with x  x0 and x 6= x0, ui(x) > ui(x0); strictly
quasi-concave, i.e. for any x; x0 2 Rm+ with ui(x)  ui(x0) and x 6= x0, and any  2 R
with 0 <  < 1, ui(x+ (1  )x0) > ui(x0) for each i 2 N .
In an exchange economy E, an n-tuple of consumption bundles a = (a1; :::; an) 2 Rnm+
is called an allocation, and a positive m-vector p = (p1; :::; pm) 2 Rm++ is called a price. A
pair of a price and an allocation (p; a) 2 Rm++Rnm+ is said to be a Walras equilibrium
i ai 2 argmaxfui(ai)j ai  0; p  ai  p  !ig for all i 2 N and
P
i2N a

i =
P
i2N !i.
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We will employ the following well-known facts, the proofs of which can be found in
standard textbooks such as Mas-colell, et al. (1995).
Remark 3 A Walras equilibrium (p; a) exists and is Pareto ecient under our condi-
tions, that is, there exists no allocation a such that
P
i2N ai 
P
i2N !i, ui(a

i )  ui(ai)
for all i 2 N , and uj(aj) > uj(aj) for some j 2 N .
We introduce a strategic exchange game GE = (N; (Xi)i2N ; (ui)i2N) associated with
E due to Scarf (1971). The set of players N is identical to the set of agents in E. For
each i 2 N , dene
Xi =

xi = (xi1; :::; xin) 2 Rmn+
 xij = (x1ij; :::; xmij );8j 2 N ;P
j2N x
h
ij = !
h
i ;8h = 1; :::;m:

:
For each i; j 2 N and h = 1; :::;m, xhij denotes the amount of h-th commodity that i
gives to j. To dene the payo function, we dene an allocation function a : X ! Rmn+
such that a(x) = (a1(x); :::; an(x)) and ai(x) = !i 
P
j2N xij+
P
j2N xji for each i 2 N .
Then, the payo function vi : X ! R is dened by vi(x) = ui(ai(x)) for all i 2 N and
any x 2 X.
The following fact follows from the monotonicity of the utility functions, which was
also pointed out by Hirai, et al. (2004).
Remark 4 For each i 2 N , di = (di1; :::; din) such that
dij =
(
!i if i = j;
0 otherwise
is the dominant punishment strategy in GE.
Throughout this subsection, we denote di the dominant punishment strategy of each i
described in Remark 4. The strategic exchange game is an example where the inclusive
sets are equivalent to the separable payos (Ray and Vohra, 2015) as pointed out in
section 3.
Proposition 5 Let E be an exchange economy, GE be a strategic exchange game asso-
ciated with E, and  E be an -coalitional game associated with GE.
(a) Let (p; a) be a Walras equilibrium in E and x 2 X be such that a(x) = a. Then,
[x] is an inclusive set, and thus, [x] is a SP-FSS.
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(b) Let x 2 X. Then, [x] is an inclusive set if and only if v(x) is separable in  E.
Proof. Let E be an exchange economy, GE be a strategic exchange game associated
with E, and  E be an -coalitional game associated with GE.
(a) Let (p; a) be a Walras equilibrium and x 2 X be such that a(x) = a. Assume
that there exist some S 2 N and yS 2 XS such that vS(yS; dNnS)  vS(x). If S = N ,
then v(y) = v(x) follows from the eciency of the Walras equilibrium, and y 2 [x].
Thus, assume that S 6= N .
Denote a0 = a(yS; dNnS). Note that
P
i2S a
0
i 
P
i2S !i since dji = 0 for all j 2 N nS
and all i 2 S. We claim that the equality holds. Suppose thatPi2S a0i 6=Pi2S !i. Then,
there exists some y^S 2 XS such that ai(y^S; dNnS)  a0i for all i 2 S, and aj(y^S; dNnS) 6= a0j
for some j 2 S. Denote a^ = a(y^S; dNnS). Then, ui(a^i)  ui(a0i)  ui(ai ) for all i 2 S,
and uj(a^j) > uj(a
0
j)  uj(ai ) for some j 2 S. Since ai 2 argmaxfui(ai)j ai  0; p ai 
p  !ig for all i 2 N , p  a^i  p  !i for all i 2 S, and p  a^j > p  !j for some j 2 S.
Thus, p Pi2S a^i > p Pi2S !i. By p > 0, Pi2S a^i  Pi2S !i does not hold. This
contradicts that dji = 0 for all j 2 N n S and i 2 S. Thus,
P
i2S a
0
i =
P
i2S !i. Note
that this implies that yij = 0 for all i 2 S and all j 2 N n S since a0i = ai(yS; dNnS) for
all i 2 S.
Suppose that a0j 6= aj for some j 2 S. By ui(a0i) = vi(yS; dNnS)  vi(x) = ui(ai ) for
all i 2 S and ai 2 argmaxfui(ai)j ai  0; p ai  p !ig for all i 2 N , p a0i  p !i for
all i 2 S. By a0j 6= aj for some j 2 S and the strict quasi-concavity of uj, pa0j > p!j for
some j 2 S. Thus, p Pi2S a0i > p Pi2S !i. This contradicts thatPi2S a0i =Pi2S !i.
Thus, a0i = a

i for all i 2 S.
Since
P
i2S a
0
i =
P
i2S !i and a
0
i = a

i for all i 2 S,
P
i2S !i =
P
i2S a
0
i =
P
i2S a

i andX
i2NnS
ai =
X
i2N
ai  
X
i2S
ai =
X
i2N
!i  
X
i2S
!i =
X
i2NnS
!i:
Thus, there exists some yNnS 2 XNnS such that ai(dS; yNnS) = ai for all i 2 N n S. By
yij = dij = 0 for all i 2 S and j 2 N n S, ai(y) = ai(dS; yNnS) = ai for all i 2 N n S.
Thus, vNnS(y) = vNnS(x). Then, by vS(y)  vS(yS; dNnS)  vS(x) and the eciency
of the Walras equilibrium, v(y) = v(x). Hence, y 2 [x] and [x] is an inclusive set. By
Theorem 1, [x] is a SP-FSS.
(b) The suciency has already been proved by Proposition 2. For the necessity, x
an arbitrary x 2 X such that [x] is an inclusive set. Let a = a(x). By Proposition 1(b)
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and the eciency of the strict -core, v(x) is ecient.
Assume that there exist some T and its partition P(T ) such that v(x) 2 V E (S)
for all S 2 P(T ). Then, for each S 2 P(T ), there exists some yS 2 XS such that
vS(yS; dNnS)  vS(x). Let a^S = (yS; dNnS) for each S 2 P(T ).
Fix an arbitrary Q 2 P(T ). By Proposition 1(b) and the monotonicity of ui,
vQ(yQ; dNnQ) = vQ(x) and
P
i2Q a^
Q
i =
P
i2Q !i. Thus, yij = 0 for all i 2 Q and
j 2 N nQ. Since this holds for all S 2 P(T ), yij = 0 for all i 2 T and j 2 N n T .
Since [x] is an inclusive set, there exists some yNnT 2 XNnT such that v(y) = v(x).
By yij = 0 for all i 2 T and j 2 N n T , ai(y) = ai(dT ; yNnT ) for all i 2 N n T , and thus,
vNnT (dT ; yNnT ) = vNnT (x). Hence, v(x) 2 V E (N n T ), and v(x) is separable. 
6.2 The many-to-many matching
This subsection considers a primitive strategic game with dominant punishment strate-
gies associated with a many-to-many matching problem with substitutable preferences.
The (SP-)FSS of the one-to-one and many-to-one matching problem with substitutable
preferences was well-investigated by Mouleon, et al. (2011) who considered a reasonable
denition of the indirect dominance relation. They showed that a singleton of a match-
ing is a FSS in their sense if and only if the matching is a (strong) core matching. Ray
and Vohra (2015a) as well as their Supplementary Note (Ray and Vohra, 2015b) argued
the close relationship between their FSS and the FSS by Mouleon, et al. (2011). Further,
Roketskiy (2012) considered a more general class of matching problems by dropping the
assumption of the substitutable preferences and adding contracts, while he retained the
feature of the indirect dominance relation of Mouleon, et al. (2011).
We investigate the SP-FSS in a primitive strategic game associated with a many-to-
many matching problem. If the preference of each player satises the substitutability
assumption, the associated strategic game turns out to be that with dominant punish-
ment strategies. On the other hand, our strategic game excludes the matching that is not
individually rational. By this feature, the SP-FSS in the sense of Chwe (1994) becomes
equivalent to the individually rational core matching, rather than the core matching.
Echenique and Oviedo (2006) showed that the individually rational core matching has
nice properties under a stronger condition than the present paper. They showed that
the individually rational core matching exists and can be found by a certain xed-points
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algorithm called the T -algorithm if the preferences of the players in one side satisfy the
substitutability and the preferences of the players in the other side satisfy the strong
substitutability.7
We introduce the many-to-many matching model by following Echenique and Oviedo
(2006) with slight modications. A (many-to-many) matching problem is dened by a
tuple M = (F;W;P ), where F = ff1; :::; frg is the set of rms, W = fw1; :::; wsg is the
set of workers, and P = (P (f1); :::; P (fr); P (w1); :::; P (ws)) is the preference prole of
F [W .
For each f 2 F , S 2 2W is called a set of f 's partners, and for each w 2 W , S 2 2F
is called a set of w's partners. The preference relation of each i 2 F [W is a strict and
linear ordering on the set of all sets of i's partners. For each i 2 F [W and two sets of
i's partners S; S 0, we denote S P (i) S 0 when i prefers S to S 0, and S R(i) S 0 when either
S P (i) S 0 or S = S 0. For each i 2 F [W and a set of i's partners S, let Chi(S) denote
the most preferable subset of S for i that is called the choice set of S for i. Therefore,
Chi(S) R(i) S
0 for all S 0  S. For each i 2 F [W , the preference relation P (i) is said
to be substitutable i j 2 Chi(S 0 [ fjg) implies j 2 Chi(S [ fjg) for any i's partner j
and two sets of i's partners S; S 0 such that S  S 0. A matching problem M is said to be
a matching problem with substitutability i the preference relation of any i 2 F [W is
substitutable.
A (many-to-many) matching inM is a mapping  : F [W ! 2F [2W , where for any
f 2 F and w 2 W , (i) (f) 2 2W ; (ii) (w) 2 2F ; (iii) f 2 (w) if and only if w 2 (f).
In M , a matching  is said to be individually rational i (i) = Chi((i)) for all i 2 N .
Given a matching , a block of  is a tuple (F 0;W 0; 0) where F 0  F , W 0  W , and 0
is a matching such that (i) F 0 [W 0 6= ;; (ii) 0(i)  F 0 [W 0 for all i 2 F 0 [W 0; (iii)
0(i) R(i) (i) for all i 2 F 0 [W 0; (iv) 0(i) P (i) (i) for some i 2 F 0 [W 0. A block
(F 0;W 0; 0) of a matching  is said to be individually rational i 0(i) = Chi(0(i)) for
all i 2 F 0[W 0. A matching  is said to be a core matching i there exists no block of .8
A matching  is said to be an individually rational core matching i  is individually
rational and there exists no individually rational block of .
Now, we associate a primitive strategic game GM = (N; (Xi)i2N ; (vi)i2N) with a
7We omit the denitions of the strong substitutability and the T -algorithm because we do not employ
them in this paper. See Echenique and Oviedo (2006) for the detail.
8We follow the terminology of Echenique and Oviedo (2006), while the core matching should probably
be called the strong core matching, which is more familiar.
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matching problem with substitutability M = (F;W;P ). Let N = F [W . Let Xf =
fS 2 2W jChf (S) = Sg for each f 2 F , and Xw = fS 2 2F jChw(S) = Sg. Note that
Xi 6= ; for all i 2 F [W since ; 2 Xi for all i 2 F [W . A function  from X to the set
of matchings is said to be a matching rule i for any x 2 X,
(x)(f) = fw 2 xf jf 2 xwg for each f 2 F ;
(x)(w) = ff 2 xwjw 2 xfg for each w 2 W .
The payo function of i 2 N is dened consistently with P (i) as follows: vi(x) > vi(x0)
if and only if (x)(i) P (i) (x0)(i) for all i 2 N and all x; x0 2 X.9
We can easily conrm that (x) is a matching for any x 2 X as the following way.
Let x 2 X, f 2 F , and w 2 W . It is obvious that (i) and (ii) of the denition of the
matching is satised in (x). For (iii), if f 2 (x)(w), then w 2 xf and f 2 xw. Thus,
w 2 (x)(f), and vice versa. Further, the following lemma points out that our strategic
game completely captures the individually rational matchings.
Lemma 1 Let M be a matching problem with substitutability and GM be the strategic
game associated with M . A matching  is individually rational in M if and only if
(x) =  for some x 2 X in GM .
Proof. Let M be a matching problem with substitutability and GM be the strategic
game associated with M . We rst show the necessity. Let  be an individually rational
matching in M . By the individual rationality, Chi((i)) = (i) for all i 2 N . Thus,
(i) 2 Xi for all i 2 N . Dene xi = (i) for all i 2 N . Then, (x)(i) = (i) for all
i 2 N by the denition of .
Next, we show the suciency. Let  be a matching such that  = (x) for some
x 2 X. Fix an arbitrary i 2 N . We assume that i 2 F . The case where i 2 W is
omitted because it can be proved in the same way as the following proof. It suces to
show that (x)(i)  Chf ((x)(i)). If (x)(i) = ;, then the proof is done. Therefore,
assume that (x)(i) 6= ;.
Fix an arbitrary j 2 (x)(i). Note that j 2 (x)(i)  xi, and thus, (x)(i) n fjg 
xi n fjg. By the denition of Xi, j 2 xi = Chi(xi) = Chi((xi n fjg) [ fjg). By the
9Our strategic game is very similar with that by Konishi and Unver (1999). The only dierence is
that we restrict the strategy sets to the individually rational partners.
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substitutability of the preference relation and (x)(i)nfjg  xi nfjg, j 2 Chi(((x)(i)n
fjg) [ fjg) = Chi((x)(i)). Hence, (x)(i)  Chi((x)(i)). 
Now, we state and prove the result of this subsection.
Proposition 6 LetM be a matching problem with substitutability and GM be the strate-
gic game associated with M .
(a) In GM , di = ; is the dominant punishment strategy of i for each i 2 N .
(b) For any x 2 X, [x] is a SP-FSS in GM if and only if (x) is the individually rational
core matching in M .
Proof. LetM be a matching problem with substitutability and GM be a strategic game
associated with M .
(a) Fix an arbitrary i 2 N , an arbitrary xi 2 Xi n f;g, and an arbitrary z i 2 X i.
We assume i 2 F . The case where i 2 W is omitted because it can be proved in the
same way as the following proof. For each f 2 F n fig, (xi; z i)(f) = (;; z i)(f), and
thus, vf (xi; z i) = vf (;; z i).
Fix an arbitrary w 2 W . First, assume that either i =2 zw or w =2 xi. Then,
i =2 (xi; z i)(w). Thus, (xi; z i)(w) = (;; z i)(w) and vw(xi; z i) = vw(;; z i). Next,
assume that both i 2 zw and w 2 xi. Then, i 2 (xi; z i)(w) and (;; z i)(w) =
(xi; z i)(w) n fig. By Lemma 1, Chw((xi; z i)(w)) = (xi; z i)(w). It follows that
(xi; z i)(w) P (w) (xi; z i)(w) n fig = (;; z i)(w). Thus, vw(xi; z i) > vw(;; z i).
Hence, ; is the dominant punishment strategy of i.
(b) Let x 2 X. First, assume that [x] is a SP-FSS. Then, [x] is an inclusive set in GM
by Theorem 2. Suppose that (x) is not an individually rational core matching in M .
By Lemma 1, (x) is individually rational. Then, there exists an individually rational
block (F 0;W 0; 0) of . Thus, (i) F 0 [W 0 6= ;, (ii) 0(i)  F 0 [W 0 for all i 2 F 0 [W 0,
(iii) 0(i) R(i) (i) for all i 2 F 0 [W 0, (iv) 0(i) P (i) (i) for some i 2 F 0 [W 0, and
(v) Chi(
0(i)) = 0(i) for all F 0 [W 0. By (v), 0(i) 2 Xi for all i 2 F 0 [W 0. Dene
x0i = 
0(i) for all i 2 F 0[W 0. Then, (x0F 0[W 0 ; ;Nn(F 0[W 0))(i) = 0(i) for all i 2 F 0[W 0 by
(ii). This contradicts Proposition 1(b) by (iii) and (iv). Hence, (x) is an individually
rational core matching in M .
Next, assume that (x) is an individually rational core matching in M . By The-
orem 1 and (a) of this proposition, it suces to show that [x] is an inclusive set.
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Suppose that there exist some S 2 N and xS such that vS(xS; ;NnS)  vS(x). Note
that Chi((x

S; ;NnS)(i)) = (xS; ;NnS)(i) for all i 2 S by Lemma 1. Note also that
(xS; ;NnS)(i)  S for all i 2 S by the denition of . Since (x) is an individually
rational core matching and the preferences are strict, (xS; ;NnS)(i) = (x)(i) for all
i 2 S. Then, (x)(j)  N n S for all j 2 N n S by (x)(i) = (xS; ;NnS)(i)  S for all
i 2 S.
Since (x) is an individually rational core matching, (x)(j) 2 Xj for all j 2 N n S.
Denote xj = (x)(j) for each j 2 N n S. For all j 2 N n S, (;S; xNnS)(j) = (x)(j) by
(x)(j)  N n S. Since i =2 xj for all i 2 S and j 2 N n S, (x)(i) = (xS; ;NnS)(i) =
(x)(i) for all i 2 S and (x)(j) = (;S; xNnS)(j) = (x)(j) for all j 2 N n S. Thus,
x 2 [x], and [x] is an inclusive set in GM . 
Proposition 6(a) heavily relies on the substitutability of the preferences. Consider
the following simple example. Let F = ff1g and W = fw1; w2g. The preference rela-
tion of f1 is fw1; w2g P (f1) fw1g P (f1) ; P (f1) fw2g, which is not substitutable, and
that of wi is ff1g P (wi) ; for each i = 1; 2. Then, neither ; nor ff1g is the dom-
inant punishment strategy of w2 since vf1(fw1; w2g; ;; ;) > vf1(fw1; w2g; ;; ff1g) and
vf1(fw1; w2g; ff1g; ff1g) > vf1(fw1; w2g; ff1g; ;). Therefore, our result cannot be ex-
tended to the model by Roketskiy (2012) who allowed general preferences by dropping
the substitutability condition.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper characterized the SP-FSS in the strategic games with dominant punishment
strategies by the notion of the inclusiveness. The union of the inclusive sets has a very
close connection to the strict -core. A further characterization is given to the SP-FSS
in the binary game with strictly dominant punishment strategies. Some applications are
also investigated. Our results may simplify the investigation on the SP-FSS for a variety
of strategic games as we mentioned in section 1. We conclude with a remark.
This paper did not consider the FSS whose elements yield multiple payos. In
coalitional and partition function games, Beal, et al. (2008), Ray and Vohra (2015a),
and Chander (2015) showed that there is no FSS including multiple payos at least
under a certain condition. On the other hand, a FSS yielding multiple payos may
exist in a number of strategic games. See for example, Suzuki and Muto (2005) and
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Kawasaki and Muto (2009). Although we did not consider such a FSS, investigating it
is also important since it may have novel implications. For example, Kawasaki and Muto
(2009) showed that the multiple-payo FSS supports the over-contribution to a public
good in a voluntary contributing situation as we reviewed in Section 3, which has been
rarely discussed in the literature so far. As we pointed out in Section 5, investigating the
FSS with multiple payos should exploit the structure of the specic game. The results
in the present paper allow us to concentrate for investigating such a FSS for various
strategic games. We remain this problem for future research.
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